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COMMENT
Federal Tax Liens and State Homestead
Exemptions:
The Aftermath of United States v. Rodgers
Introduction
T HE definition of property interests has traditionally been
considered the responsibility of individual states.' Courts
have held that legal property interests are to be "created" by each
state.' Similarly, it has been considered within the power of the
federal government to define the rules of operation for the fed-
eral taxation system.3
Given that the system of federal taxation provides for taxa-
tion of property and its attachment or seizure for failure to pay
taxes,4 the states-in their property-defining capacity-necessarily
have a role to play in the tax-enforcement system. This mutual
involvement is sequential: state law initially defines the property
interests; federal law then determines the federal tax conse-
quences of those interests.5 Substantial difficulties arise, however,
1. See Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); De Vaugh v. Hutchinson, 165 U.S. 566,
570 (1897) ("[i]t is a principle firmly established that to the law of the State in which the
land is situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation and trans-
fer .. " (citing United States v. Crosby, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 115 (1812))); Clark v. Gra-
ham, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 577 (1821); McGoon v. Scales, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 23 (1869); Brine
v. Insurance Co., 96 U.S. (6 Otto.) 627 (1877)). See also 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws §§ 17
(character of property determined according to law of place where located-"lex loci rei
sitae"); 19(3) (the validity of a deed of realty is tested by law of place wherein land is
located) (1967).
2. See United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971). See also Aquilino v. United
States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960); United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 241-42 (1960);
United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1958).
3. 35 AM. JuR. 2D Federal Tax Enforcement § 2 (1967).
4. See Enochs v. Smith, 359 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1966); Simpson v. Thomas, 271 F.2d
450 (4th Cir. 1959). See generally 35 AM. JuR. 2D Federal Tax Enforcement § 6 (1967).
5. Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 513; Bess, 357 U.S. at 56-57.
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when the state property interests are defined so that federal tax
enforcement is hindered.
This Comment will closely examine one such definitional con-
flict: the clash of state-defined homestead exemptions and the
foreclosure element of federal tax lien enforcement.6 Analysis will
center around the recent Supreme Court case of United States v.
Rodgers.7 In Rodgers, the Court dealt head on with the power of
the state of Texas to exempt certain homestead property from tax
lien 8 foreclosure sale, where one of the co-owners of the home-
stead was not indebted.9 Although state homestead exemptions
cannot operate directly to preclude foreclosure sale of the delin-
quent taxpayer's interest,10 separate and difficult questions are
6. The enforcement provision of the federal tax lien law is found at section 7403,
which provides:
In any case where there has been a refusal or neglect to pay any tax, or to
discharge any liability in respect thereof, whether or not levy has been made,
the Attorney General or his delegate, at the request of the Secretary, may di-
rect a civil action to be filed in a district court of the United States to enforce
the lien of the United States under this title with respect to such tax or liability
or to subject any property, of whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in which
he has any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax or liability.
26 U.S.C. § 7403(a) (1982).
7. 461 U.S. 677 (1983).
8. See 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1982).
9. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 680. In the companion case of Ingram, the husband was indi-
vidually indebted for approximately $9000, and the wife (and co-owner) was jointly in-
debted for $283.33 in federal taxes. Id. at 688.
10. See W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LIENS 20 (3d ed. 1972). One writer has commented on
the different treatments accorded exemptions and property rights: "[I]t may be generally
stated that a state decision or statute creating an exemption will not be followed by the
Commissioner, while state laws protecting property rights will be observed" (citing as exam-
ple Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932)). Comment, Federal Lien Provisions and State
Law: The Problem of Giving Effect to Both in the Area of Joint Property Ownership, 25 Sw. LJ.
456 (1971) (emphasis in original).
The respondents (Rodgers) in their brief opposing writ of certiorari, stressed the fact
that the Texas homestead exemption is a firmly established property right. In their sum-
mary of argument, the respondents stated:
Since Respondent's homestead interest is a separate vested life estate, not
merely an exemption from creditors, her deceased taxpayer husband's tax lia-
bility may not be enforced against her homestead interest. The correct test in a
majority of decisions is whether state law characterizes the homestead as an
exemption from creditors or an estate in land. United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d
657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 831 (1947); United States v. Hershberger, 475
F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973); Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963). This distinction of state law. . . is the proper
decisional test because, if state law views the homestead as an estate in land,
then property rights vest in a third person not liable for the tax.
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raised where the government seeks to force sale of the entire
premises in which the delinquent holds only a partial interest.
This Comment will present analysis in three sections. Section
One will portray the background against which the Rodgers case
was presented to the Supreme Court. Section Two is devoted to
critical analysis and evaluation of the Rodgers decision. Finally,
Section Three will discuss the practical impact of the decision.
Specific attention will be given to: (a) remaining state law involve-
ment in the tax enforcement system, (b) remaining homestead ex-
emption protections, (c) the adequacy of compensation of non-de-
linquent interest holders, (d) debtor-creditor implications, (e)
effect on tenancies-by-the-entirety, and (f) the apparent elevation
of the Internal Revenue Service's creditor status.
I. BACKGROUND TO Rodgers
Under section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code,'" when a
taxpayer refuses to pay his or her assessed federal taxes upon de-
mand 2 a lien automatically accrues 3 and attaches to "all property
and rights to property ... belonging to such person."' 4 The IRS
11. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1982). The Federal Tax Lien Act was enacted by Congress in
the exercise of its power under article I, section 8, of the United States Constitution "to lay
and collect taxes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The federal tax lien was first promulgated
in 1866, 14 Stat. 104, 107, which later became, in 1866, section 3186 and which is cur-
rently found in section 6321 of the Code. S. RIESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDI-
TORS' RIGHTS AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 142-43 (3d ed. 1979).
12. If the taxpayer fails to pay the tax within ten days of assessment, notice and de-
mand, the government becomes a secured creditor (instead of retaining its general creditor
status). See PRACTICING LAW INsTITUTE, FEDERAL TAx PRACTIE AND PROCEDURE. PRACTICING
BEFORE THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 21 (1976). Unless waived, demand is essential for
the creation of the lien. See Bauer v. Foley, 404 F.2d 1215 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
Coson, 286 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1961).
13. See Note, Federal Priorities and Tax Liens, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1272 (1963);
Comment, Federal Tax Lien-Is it Effective Against a State Homestead Exemption?, 52 N.C.L.
REV. 695, 695-96 (1974). Plumb notes that "it is quite possible that a financially troubled
taxpayer, who has deferred payment of an assessed tax, will not know whether or when a
tax lien has been imposed upon all his property because initially the general tax lien is
usually of the secret variety. It arises automatically on the occurrence of certain events and
without express notification to the taxpayer." W. PLUMB, supra note 10, at 10. Justice
Blackmun noted that Plumb's views may be due "particular attention," since Plumb was
the principal draftsman of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 717 n.6
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
14. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1982) (emphasis added). Plumb discusses "belonging to" as a
limitation on the scope of the lien. W. PLUMB, supra note 10, at 27. The lien may attach to
after-acquired property as well. See, e.g., Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265,
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may enforce its lien by initiating a civil action under section 7403
in a federal district court.1 5 The lien provision of section 6321 is
written in broad and sweeping language16 and is a major instru-
ment of tax law enforcement. 7
In Rodgers, the Supreme Court responded to a lien enforce-
ment problem, the resolution of which had resulted in a conflict
among the circuits. 8 The courts of appeal were grappling with
267 (1945).
15. 26 U.S.C. § 7403 (1982); Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems (First
Installment), 13 TAx L. REv. 249 (1958). Subdivision (c) of section 7403 authorizes the dis-
trict court to "decree a sale" of all property upon which the United States holds a lien.
The government may also sue in equity for the unpaid amount, obtain judgment and exer-
cise rights of ordinary judgment creditors. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 682. See United States v.
Haar, 27 F.2d 250 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 634 (1928); W. PLUMB, supra note 10, at
252.
16. Section 6321 provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax refuses to pay the same after demand, the
amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax or assessable
penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a
lien in favor of the United States upon all property, whether real or personal,
belonging to such person.
26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1982). See also W. PLUMB, supra note 10, at 18; Plumb, supra note 15, at
251. Plumb calls the section 6321 lien a "catchall lien"-it attaches to property of "any
person" liable to pay "any tax" and this includes "all property and rights to property"
belonging to that person.
17. See Comment, supra note 13. The general purposes of the lien include: the immo-
bilization of the taxpayer's property while enforcement procedures are initiated (or tax is
paid); uniformity, see infra, note 18; and the securing of the government's priority over
other creditors. See W. PLUMB, supra note 10, at 13. See also United States v. Brosnan, 363
U.S. 237 (1960). The purpose of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 (codified as amended
at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6323 (1982)) was to adjust the tax liens so that they had the same
priority scheme as the Uniform Commercial Code. See Pine Builders, Inc. v. United States,
413 F. Supp. 77, 80 (E.D. Va. 1976). The Rodgers Court saw the purposes of the "formida-
ble arsenal of tax collection tools" as including the ensurance of "the prompt and certain
enforcement of the tax laws in a system relying primarily on self-reporting." Rodgers, 461
U.S. at 683.
18. Of the eight circuits which have ruled on the issue of the government's right to
force sale of the entirety ofjointly owned property, six have held that the sale was allowed
under §§ 6321 and 7403 of the Code. These six include the second, third, fourth, seventh,
eighth, and ninth circuits. See Herndon v. United States, 501 F.2d 1219, 1222-23 (8th Cir.
1974); United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
931 (1973); United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1970); Washington
v. United States, 402 F.2d 2, 7 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971); United
States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699, 702-03 (7th Cir. 1964); United States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d
422 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Mazzara, 530 F. Supp. 1380, 1384-85 (D.N.J. 1982).
The minority circuits include the fifth and tenth. See United States v. Hershberger, 475
F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973); Folsom v. United States, 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962). The
Rodgers case arose in the fifth circuit.
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the difficult question of how to give effect to both the federal tax
lien provision and state homestead exemption laws when property
was jointly owned.1" The issue was difficult: whether the IRS
could enforce lien rights against a delinquent taxpayer holding
only a partial interest in property, and force the sale of the entire
property. This issue first arose before the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Folsom, 20 and has caused
problems ever since.21
In Folsom, the federal government sought to enforce its lien
through section 7403(c) of the Code and force sale of the entirety
of the real property in which the delinquent taxpayer owned a
one-sixth undivided interest. The district court held that the gov-
ernment could enforce its tax lien and force judicial sale of the
entire property. 22 The court of appeals reversed, holding that sec-
tion 7403 allows for forced sale of only the delinquent taxpayer's
interest in the real property.23 This interest limitation would allow
for a forced sale of the delinquent taxpayer's one-sixth interest,
but would preclude sale of the entirety of the property. Since the
Folsom decision, the circuits have divided on the issue of whether a
state-defined property interest may operate to prevent forced sale
of the entire property.24
The stakes in Rodgers were high because it dealt with home-
steads, which are devised to protect an owner's possession and en-
joyment against creditors. 25 A homestead is defined as the dwell-
ing house constituting the family residence, together with the land
19. Much has been written on the issue. See Note, United States v. Rodgers: The Effect
of Federal Tax Foreclosure Upon the Texas Homestead, 35 BAYLOR L. REv. (1983); Note, Federal
Priorities and Tax Liens, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1272 (1963); Comment, supra note 13;
Comment, Federal Lien Provisions and State Law: The Problem of Giving Effect to Both in the
Area of Joint Property Ownership, 25 Sw. L.J. 456 (1971).
20. 306 F.2d 361 (1962). The Folsom Court stated: "Apparently, there are no Federal
appellate decisions involving the specific question to be decided in the instant case." Id. at
367 n.10.
21. The Folsom decision was destined to be the minority rule, and therefore had to be
distinguished by the majority of circuits. See supra note 18.
22. Folsom, 306 F.2d at 362.
23. Id. at 367. It is interesting to compare the Folsom Court's review of section 7403
and the Rodgers Court's review of that same section. The Folsom Court additionally stressed
the words "of the delinquent." Id. This slight difference in emphasis may reflect their cen-
tral difference on the limits of section 7403. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
24. The majority declined to apply this interest limitation to enforcement of the sec-
tion 6321 lien. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 690-91. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660-61 (5th. ed. 1979).
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on which it is situated and the appurtenances connected
therewith.26
The issue confronted in Rogers is not whether the govern-
ment will recover duly owed taxes.27 Rather, it is whether the fed-
eral tax collector should delay enforcement against the home-
stead, or foreclose immediately. 2 The problem is one of
promptness, not certainty.2 9 The homestead exemption has been
likened to a life estate since it is an interest in the holder until
death or abandonment.30 If the federal government is prevented
from immediately forcing the sale of the homestead, it must in-
stead wait until the interest holder dies or abandons the home-
stead, whichever comes first.31 Excluding the situations where
property values decrease or the lien amount exceeds the value of
the property, little is lost by delayed enforcement.3 2 Although the
IRS is deprived of the use value of the sale proceeds, the accruing
interest on the assessed deficiency should provide adequate com-
pensation. 3 Since much will be lost by immediate enforcement
(firmly established homestead rights), and little gained, public pol-
icy would appear to be best served by delayed enforcement.
State law has a crucial role to play in the federal tax collection
scheme. 4 Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, must look
to state law to determine the property rights to which the tax lien
26. 40 C.J.S. Homesteads § 1 (1984).
27. This assumes that delay will not result in significant loss to the government. See
infra text accompanying notes 123-25 (discussion of Justice Blackmun's dissent).
28. See infra note 54.
29. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. The Court saw the "prompt and certain
enforcement" of the tax laws as among the purposes of sections 6321, 6331 and 7403.
Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 683.
30. The Rodgers Court clearly recognized the similarity of the Texas homestead ex-
emption and life estates, although they stated that it was a somewhat "hazardous analogy."
461 U.S. at 685-86 (citing Flew v. Qualtrough, 624 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Tex. App. 1981)
(homestead exemption, unlike life estate, can be lost by abandonment)).
31. Under Texas law, the homestead interest is a vested estate in land and can be
divested during the lifetime of the holder only by abandonment or voluntary conveyance.
Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 585, 218 S.W.2d 428, 436 (1949). The factors caus-
ing loss of the homestead interest vary from state to state. These factors include death,
abandonment, alienation, dissolution of family relationship, estoppel or waiver. 40 CJ.S.
Homesteads § 15 (1936).
32. Interest accrues on unpaid taxes from the date payment is due until payment is
made. 26 U.S.C. § 6601(a) (1982). See also W. PLUMB, supra note 10, at 227.
33. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun questioned the advantages of immediate enforce-
ment of lien rights through forced sale of the entire property. 461 U.S. at 724-25.
34. See W. PLUMB, supra note 10, at 27-30. See also supra note 2.
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may attach. 5 The threshold question is whether the taxpayer has
"property" or "rights to property" to which the tax lien could
attach. 31 State law governs in the area of definition of these prop-
erty interests.
3 7
Under this approach to federal tax collection, both state and
federal law are involved and are said to strike "a proper balance
between the legitimate and traditional interest which the State has
in creating and defining the property interest of its citizens, and
the necessity for a uniform administration of the federal revenue
statutes." ' This mutual involvement becomes problematic when
federal and state laws overlap.39 Such overlapping often occurs
when the government attempts to enforce 40 its lien against a tax-
payer who holds only a fractional interest in the property-and
the holder of the remaining interest is unindebted-by selling the
entire property instead of only the delinquent taxpayer's interest.
A cursory review of the "rules" in this area is not particularly
35. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13 (1960). See also United States v.
Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971); United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 240-42 (1960).
36. Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 512.
37. Id. at 513; see also United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958). In short, state law
creates the property and rights to property to which the lien attaches. Once state law de-
termines the taxpayer's interest in the property, "we enter the province of federal law" to
determine the consequences of the interest. Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 514. The Aquilino Court
stated: "[wie have consistently held [that federal law] determines the priority of competing
liens asserted against the taxpayer's 'property' or 'rights to property'." Id.
After it is determined that state law has created sufficient interests in the taxpayer for
the lien to attach, state law is inoperative to prevent attachment. Bess, 357 U.S. at 56-57.
The Rodgers case involved issues of enforcement, not attachment. See infra note 40.
38. Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 514. This balance is also discussed extensively in Brosnan. See
infra note 42. For an early discussion of state law involvement, see Comment, Property Sub-
ject to the Federal Tax Lien, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1485 (1964).
39. The Rodgers Court did not see much of an overlap. Instead it saw the limits as
clearly separable. The Court stated: "[lt has long been the axiom of our tax collection
scheme that, although the definition of underlying property interest is left to state law, the
consequences that attach to those interests is a matter left to federal law." Rodgers, 461
U.S. at 683 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 205 (1971)). Apparently, they
viewed forced sale of the entire homestead interest as consequential and therefore properly
a federal role.
The court of appeals in Ro[d]gers (the appellee's name was misprinted as "Rogers" in
the title, though not the body, of the court of appeals' decision) had distinguished Mitchell,
and other cases, on the ground that they did not involve homestead property interests. 649
F.2d 1117, 1121 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981) rev'd, 461 U.S. 677 (1983).
40. It should be noted that the attachment of the lien is not at issue here. The central
issue in both Rodgers and Folsom, rather, is the time and method of enforcement of the tax
lien.
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enlightening. As a general rule, the exemption of property from
federal tax collection is governed by federal, not state law.4 ' State
law determines however, what property rights the taxpayer
holds.42 Federal law "merely attaches consequences, federally de-
fined, to rights created under state law."'4 3 These two principles
conflict when state definition precludes federal enforcement of
the lien. This conflict arises, for example, when the IRS seeks to
enforce its rights and force sale of the entirety of the property but
41. See, e.g., United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
831 (1947) (bankrupt debtor may not invoke a state homestead exemption to defeat a fed-
eral tax lien). It has been stated that state homestead exemption laws are inapplicable to
tax collection procedure. See United States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d 422, 427 (8th Cir. 1960).
The assertion that state law is "inapplicable" is clearly true in some collection contexts.
Section 6334 of the Code specifically exempts certain property from administrative levy.
Subsection (a) specifically exempts: wearing apparel and schoolbooks; fuel, provisions, fur-
niture, and personal effects; books and tools of the trade, business or profession; unemploy-
ment benefits; undelivered mail; certain annuity and pension payments; workmen's com-
pensation payments; child support payments; and minimum wages. 26 U.S.C. § 6334(a)
(1982). Subsection (c) provides: "Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, no
property. . . shall be exempt from levy other than the property specifically made exempt
by subsection (a)." 26 U.S.C. § 6334(c) (1982).
Plumb states that, "[f]or unexplained reasons exemption is provided only from levy, not
from the lien itself, so theoretically the Government could circumvent this limited sanctu-
ary by initiating a judicial action to foreclose its tax lien, but cases of this type cannot be
found in the reports." W. PLUMB, supra note 10, at 20-21.
42. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960), stated that
federal tax liens are "wholly creatures of federal statute," id. at 240, but went on to say
that state law should nevertheless play a major role. The Court's reasoning is worth full
recitation:
We nevertheless believe it desirable to adopt as federal law state law gov-
erning divestiture of federal tax liens, except to the extent that Congress may
have entered the field. It is true that such liens form part of the machinery for
the collection of federal taxes, the objective of which is "uniformity, as far as it
may be." United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361, 364. However, when
Congress resorted to the use of liens, it came into an area of complex property
relationships long since settled and regulated by state law. We believe that, so
far as this Court is concerned, the need for uniformity in this instance is out-
weighed by the severe dislocation to local property relationships which would
result from our disregarding state procedures. Long accepted nonjudicial
means of enforcing private liens would be embarrassed, if not nullified where
federal liens are involved, and many titles already secured by such means would
be cast in doubt. We think it more harmonious with the tenets of our federal
system and more consistent with what Congress has already done in this area,
not to inject ourselves into the network of competing private property interests,
by displacing well-established state procedures governing their enforcement, or
superimposing on them a new federal rule.
Id. at 241-42.
43. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958).
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state law requires that the unindebted cotenant be left
undisturbed.44
II. THE Rodgers DECISION
A common situation in which this dilemma arises is one
where a husband and wife own homestead property, and one of
them becomes individually indebted to the federal government
for unpaid taxes. When the federal government obtains a section
6321 lien against the indebted spouse's interest in the property
and moves to enforce its lienholder's rights through a judicially
forced sale, state homestead exemptions protecting the
unindebted spouse may arise to block enforcement.4 5 The Rodgers
Court was presented with exactly this problem.46
The Court held that section 7403 of the Code 7 empowers a
federal district court to force the sale of the entire homestead de-
spite the fact that the spouse of the delinquent taxpayer, who
holds an undivided one-half interest in the property,48 is
unindebted. This power is limited "to some degree" by the equi-
table discretion of the federal district courts,49 and the nondelin-
quent spouse is entitled to "complete compensation" out of the
proceeds of the sale. 50
The Rodgers decision involves two cases which were consoli-
dated for oral argument before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. Both cases, United States v. Ro[d]gers,5 1 and Ingram v. Dal-
las Department of Housing & Urban Rehabilitation,52 involved com-
munity property53 and the homestead exemption provisions of the
44. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
45. See supra text accompanying note 39; See also infra note 54.
46. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
47. 26 U.S.C. § 7403 (1982). See supra note 6.
48. Both Rodgers and its companion case Ingram involyed community property and
homestead interest under Texas law. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. For discus-
sion of the impact of the Rodgers decision upon tenancy-by-the-entirety property, see infra
notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
49. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 703-11.
50. Id. at 680.
51. 649 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 677 (1983).
52. 649 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 677 (1983).
53. The Texas community property interest is a matter of both constitutional and stat-
utory entitlement. See infra note 56. Plumb sees community property law as particularly
troubling in this area:
No safe generalizations may be made concerning the subjection of commu-
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Texas Constitution.5 ' The Texas homestead exemption provides
for strong protection of the family homestead and has been de-
scribed as "certainly sweeping and probably the most far reaching
of any in the country.
55
Lucille and Phillip Rodgers, husband and wife, owned as com-
munity property58 a residence in Dallas, Texas, which they occu-
nity property to liens for the separate tax liabilities of husband and wife, be-
cause of the wide variety of rules governing the rights of creditors in the eight
community property states, and the paucity of authority on some of the more
knotty problems that may arise.
W. PLUMB, supra note 10, at 32 (citations omitted). The Rodgers case appears to be one of
these "knotty" problems.
54. The Texas exemption is a constitutional exemption. Article 16 of the Texas State
Constitution grants two major protections for the family and the family homestead. It pro-
vides for both the establishment of a homestead, Tax. CONsT. art. XVI, § 50, and the man-
ner of descent of rights in the homestead to members of the immediate family, thereby
protecting the family in case of the death of the owner, TEx. CoNsr. art. XVI, § 52.
Section 50, provides that "[t]he homestead of a family, or of a single adult person, shall
be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of debts .. " TEx. CONST. art.
XVI, § 50 (emphasis added). Section 52 provides:
On the death of the husband or wife, or both, the homestead shall descend and
vest in like manner as other real property of the deceased, and shall be gov-
erned by the same laws of descent and distribution, but it shall not be parti-
tioned among the heirs of the deceased during the lifetime of the surviving
husband or wife, or so long as the survivor may elect to use or occupy the same
T XAs CONST., art. XVI, § 52.
In substance, the Texas Constitution provides for an exemption of the homestead prop-
erty from the reach of most creditors under section 50, and also gives the members of the
family unit rights in the homestead itself under section 52. Under Texas law, upon mar-
riage, where one spouse owns property to be used as a family home, the other spouse
receives a separate, undivided possessory interest in the homestead. TExAs CONsT., art.
XVI, § 52. Texas case law has clearly established that this interest in the homestead pursu-
ant to the constitution is a bona fide property interest, and not merely an exemption or
matter of statutory entitlement. See Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W.2d 428
(1949).
55. See Comment, The Husband's Power to Adjust Outstanding Equities Against the Home-
stead, 12 BAYLOR L. REv. 202 (1960).
56. Article 16, section 15 of the Texas Constitution provides:
All property, both real and personal, of a spouse owned or claimed before mar-
riage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent, shall be the sepa-
rate property of that spouse; and laws shall be passed more clearly defining the
rights of the spouses, in relation to separate and community property; provided
that persons about to marry and spouses, without the intention to defraud pre-
existing creditors, may by written instrument from time to time partition be-
tween themselves all or part of their property, then existing or to be acquired,
or exchange between themselves the community interest of one spouse or fu-
ture spouse in any property for the community interest of the other spouse or
future spouse in other community property then existing or to be acquired,
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pied as their homestead. In 1972, the IRS issued assessments of
more than $900,000 against Phillip for unpaid federal wagering
taxes.57 Three years after the assessments were issued, Phillip
Rodgers died. Lucille Rodgers continued to occupy the property
as her homestead residence and, at the time this case was heard,
resided there with her second husband. In 1977, the federal gov-
ernment filed suit under sections 7402 and 7403 of the Code to
reduce the assessments against Phillip Rodgers to a lien judgment,
and enforce the judgment through a judicially forced sale of the
Rodgers' property.5 On cross-motion for summary judgment, the
district court held that the federal tax lien could not defeat Lu-
cille Rodger's state-defined right to have her homestead exempt
from forced sale.59 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed on the homestead issue.60
In the companion case of Ingram v. Dallas Department of Hous-
ing & Urban Rehabilitation,"1 similar issues were presented. During
their marriage, Joerene and Donald Ingram purchased a resi-
whereupon the portion or interest set aside to each spouse shall be and consti-
tute a part of the separate property and estate of such spouse or future spouse;
and the spouses may from time to time, by written instrument, agree between
themselves that the income or property from all or part of the separate prop-
erty then owned by one of them, or which thereafter might be acquired, shall
be the separate property of that spouse; and if one spouse makes a gift of prop-
erty to the other that gift is presumed to include all the income or property
which might arise from that gift of property.
Tax. CONsT. art. XVI, § 15.
Section 5.01 of the Texas Family Code provides:
(a) A spouse's separate property consists of:
(1) the property owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage; (2) the
property acquired by the spouse during marriage by gift, devise, or descent;
and
(3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during mar-
riage, except any recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage.
(b) Community property consists of the property, other than separate property,
acquired by either spouse during marriage.
Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon 1975).
57. These taxes remained unpaid until the time of Philip Rodgers death in 1974. Rod-
gers, 461 U.S. at 687.
58. Ro[d]gers, 649 F.2d at 1119. The government also argued that it was entitled to
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Id.
59. The circuit court distinguished between "mere" homestead exemptions and bona
fide homestead property rights. Ro[d]gers, 649 F.2d at 1125-27.
60. The fifth circuit is one of the minority circuits which follows the Folsom interest
limitation. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
61. 649 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981).
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dence which they owned as community property and occupied as
their homestead. In both 1972 and 1973, the IRS issued assess-
ments against Donald Ingram in the amount of $9000. A joint
assessment was also issued against both Joerene and Donald in the
amount of $283.33. In 1975, the Ingram home was destroyed by
fire. In September of 1975, the Ingrams obtained a divorce. The
negotiated divorce settlement provided that Donald would convey
his one-half interest in the community property to Joerene for
$1500. Joerene attempted to sell the fire-destroyed property,
6 2
but was unsuccessful-apparently due to the federal tax liens en-
cumbering the property.63
Joerene Ingram filed suit in federal district court to remove
the federal tax lien against the property, quiet title, and enjoin
demolition. The government removed the suit to the District
Court for the Northern District of Texas. On cross-motion, sum-
mary judgment was granted in favor of the government."' The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and re-
versed in part,65 holding that the forced sale would be allowed in
order to obtain the $283.33 in joint tax assessments against both
Joerene and Donald Ingram,66 but not to obtain the $9000 indi-
vidual assessment against Donald. 7 The taxpayers in Rodgers and
62. Id. at 1130.
63. The Supreme Court noted that the inability to sell was "apparently due" to the
encumbrance of federal tax liens. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 688. The court of appeals did not
mention this. See Ingram, 649 F.2d at 1130.
The situation was further complicated when the Dallas Department of Housing and
Urban Rehabilitation notified Joerene Ingram that unless action was taken, the premises
would be demolished (hence the title of the case-Ingram v. Dallas Dep't of Housing & Ur-
ban Rehabilitation). Joerene took no action to remedy the situation and a work order to
demolish was issued. Id.
64. The district court did not issue an opinion. See Brief of the Solicitor General in
Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 1, United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677
(1983).
65. Ingram v. Dallas Dep't of Hous. & Urban Rehabilitation, 649 F.2d 1128, 1132,
(5th Cir. 1981).
66. Both Donald and Joerene had failed to pay their joint income tax liability for
1971. Id. at 1130.
67. Id. at 1132. The court of appeals offered two separate grounds for its decision.
First, it held that the Folsom interest limitation should be applied, and that forced sales of
the entirety of the property involved in certain joint ownership situations should not be
allowed. Second, it held that even if a sale would be allowed in the joint tenancy situation,
the Texas homestead exemption would operate to preclude enforcement. The court of
appeals went so far as to say that this interest limitation applies to any cotenancy situation
in which unindebted third parties are co-owners with the delinquent taxpayer. Id. at I 125.
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Ingram appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari "in or-
der to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to the
proper interpretation of [section] 7403."' 88 The Rodgers Court
characterized the facts of the two consolidated cases as "legally
comparable, but quite distinct ... -"9 The Court saw both cases
as involving a common issue:
[W]hether [section] 7403 empowers a federal district court to order the sale
of a family home in which a delinquent taxpayer had an interest at the time
he incurred his indebtedness, but in which the taxpayer's spouse, who did
not owe any of his indebtedness, also has a separate "homestead" right as
defined by Texas law.70
The Rodgers Court divided 5-4, holding in favor of the gov-
ernment.71 The majority held that section 7403 does empower the
federal district court to force the sale of the homestead property
despite the fact that one spouse, holding a one-half undivided72
interest in the property, is unindebted. The district court may ex-
ercise its equitable discretion in enforcing this section, and the
unindebted spouse must receive "complete compensation" from
the sale proceeds.7 3 The Court expressly declined to follow the
Folsom minority rule relied upon by the court of appeals stating:
"We agree with the prevailing view that such a restrictive reading
of § 7403 flies in the face of the plain meaning of the statute. '7 4
A. Justifications Offered for Forcing Sale of the Homestead
The Court offered four arguments to support its reversal of
the court of appeals: (1) the plain language of section 7403; (2)
the general policies underlying tax collection statutes; (3) the his-
torical background of section 7403 and its similarity to in rem
68. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 690.
69. Id. at 687.
70. Id. at 680.
71. Justice Brennan wrote for the majority, joined by Justices Burger, Marshall, Pow-
ell and White; Justice Blackmun dissented, and was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens
and O'Connor.
72. Plumb discusses indivisible homestead rights as allowing attachment of liens, but
preventing enforcement: "[T]hough the liability runs against only one spouse, it may not
be enforced by sale during the life of the unindebted spouse." W. PLUMB, supra note 10, at
38. Plumb also discusses tenancy-by-the-entirety property as "one well-established sanctu-
ary beyond the reach of the Government's tax lien." Id. at 37.
73. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 680.
74. Id. at 691.
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sales; and (4) the contrast between section 7403 and section
633175 of the Code.
Like the courts of appeals which had previously held that
such sales would be allowed,76 the Court first, and most strongly,
emphasized the plain language of section 7403. After setting forth
section 7403 in its entirety, the Court restated certain portions,
selectively emphasizing its broad language. According to the
Court, subsection 7403(a) was entirely dispositive of the issue:
Section 7403(a) provides, not only that the Government may "enforce [its]
lien," but also that it seek to "subject any property, [of] whatever nature, of
the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title or interest, to the payment of
such tax or liability." This clause in and of itself defeats the reading pro-
posed by the Court of Appeals.
7 7
The Court rejected the Folsom interest limitation and instead
stated that section 7403 "must"78s be read to contemplate not only
the sale of the taxpayer's own interest, but the sale of the entire
property.79 In reaching this conclusion the Court stressed the fact
that section 7403(c) provides for distribution of the sale proceeds
"according to the findings of the court in respect to the interests of the
parties and of the United States."' 80 The requirement of distribution
of the proceeds according to "the interests of the parties" was in-
terpreted as a suggestion that sale of the entirety of the property
was intended.
The Court further stated that its holding was consistent with
the policy "inherent" in tax statutes. The Court did not elaborate
on this point but merely referred to its earlier discussion of the
purposes of tax-collection tools."' This policy favors the prompt
and certain collection of taxes.82 In the same paragraph, the
Court stated that it makes "considerable sense"8' 3 to allow the sale
of the entirety of the property when the delinquent taxpayer's in-
75. Section 6331 grants the Secretary of the Treasury power to impose an administra-
tive levy on the delinquent taxpayer's property.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1970).
77. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 692. See supra note 23.
78. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 693.
79. Id. at 694.
80. Id. at 693.
81. Id.
82. See supra note 33.
83. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 694.
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terest is worth "significantly more"" if sold together with other
interests in the property. According to the majority, section 7403
sales have been traditionally viewed much like in rem sales: 5 third
party interests that were attached to the property could be in-
cluded in and extinguished by the judicial sale."8 The majority
stated that one of the evident purposes of section 7403 was to en-
hance the position of the federal tax collector.87 With the passage
of sections 6321 and 7403 and their predecessors, the federal tax
collector was to gain some of the many advantages that the state
tax collector already had through the use of in rem sales. The state
tax collector could force the sale and bring in the interests of
third parties in the same action. The Court again stressed the fact
that section 7403 provides for third party compensation out of the
proceeds of sale, commensurate with their interests in the prop-
erty."8 One can "assume" from the fact that such a reference for
distribution according to the interests of the parties was stressed,
that section 7403 sales were intended to include third-party
interests.8 9
Lastly, the Court stated that their interpretation was bol-
stered by an examination of the elements of two tax collection
tools: the section 6331 administrative levy and the section 7403
tax lien. Under section 6331, the government may sell only the
property "belonging to such person." 90 Since section 7403 does
not have such a limitation, it can be inferred that Congress did
not intend the section 7403 sale to be limited to the delinquent
taxpayer's interest alone. Congress has applied such limitations to
other tax collection tools, but evidently declined to impose such
limitations on section 7403.
84. Id.
85. Black's Law Dictionary defines an "in rem" action as a "proceeding that takes no
cognizance of [the] owner but determines [the] right in specific property against all of the
world, equally binding on everyone." BLAcK's LAW DIMarONARY 713 (5th ed. 1979).
86. 461 U.S. at 695.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 128-30.
90. 26 U.S.C. § 6331 (1982).
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B. Limits of Equitable Discretion
The Court realized that in certain situations financial com-
pensation would not be an adequate substitute for the lost prop-
erty,91 and mitigated the harshness of its rule by imposing a judi-
cial limit on its application: the equitable discretion of the federal
district courts.92
Section 7403 contains within it both the word "shall" and the
word "may";93 therefore, an examination of the wording of the
statute alone did not help the Court to decide whether Congress
intended to allow the application of the equitable discretion of the
district courts. After careful consideration, the Court held that al-
though it was a close question, a forced sale is not required in all
circumstances and Congress did intend to grant equitable discre-
tion to the district courts in their application of section 7403. 0
The Court held that certain factors must be considered by
the district court in deciding whether to force sale. These "para-
.mount"95 factors include: prejudice to the government's financial
interests; the normal expectations of third parties; prejudice to
the interests of the third parties involved; and the relative charac-
ter and value of the interests of the liable and non-liable parties. 8
If the government has nothing to gain financially by a whole
(versus partial) sale, then forced sale of the entirety would be un-
necessary.97 In Rodgers, the government conceded this point at
oral argument.9 The prejudice to the government's position
would be measured by comparing the market price of the prop-
erty interest if it is sold separately with its price if the entire prop-
erty is sold. As the Court stated: "Simply put, the higher the ex-
pected market price, the less the prejudice, and the less weighty
91. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 704.
92. The Rodgers decision has been relied upon as holding that the task of exercising
equitable discretion should be left to the court of first instance. See United States v. Sears,
Roebuck, & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1395 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983).
93. 26 U.S.C. § 7403 (1982). Rodgers has been subsequently cited, as an interesting
comparison, as to whether the word "may" grants discretion, and if so, to what degree. See,
e.g., UAW v. Donovan, 570 F. Supp. 210, 219 (D.D.C. 1983); Sears, 719 F.2d at 1395.
94. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 706.
95. Id. at 710.
96. Id.at710-11.
97. See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text. In many situations, little is to be
gained by immediate enforcement. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
98. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 710 (citing Oral Arg. at 7, 13; Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8,
n.5).
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the Government's interest in going ahead with a sale of the entire
property."99
The Rodgers Court also stated that if the non-liable party had
no legal expectation that the homestead property would be pro-
tected from forced sale, then there would be little reason not to
authorize sale.1"' The courts therefore should consider these ex-
pectations in their determination of whether to allow sale. The
Court then stated that the district courts should consider the
likely prejudice to third parties resulting from a forced sale and
make their determination with due consideration of both personal
dislocation costs and undercompensation. °1 The Court referred
to situations in which monetary payment would clearly be inade-
quate compensation for loss of a "roof over one's head."102 The
Court explained through example: If a third party owns real prop-
erty but has no present possessory or fee interest in the property,
there is little reason not to allow sale. Conversely, if the third
party has a possessory or fee interest and that interest is worth
99% of the value of the property, then there is "virtually no rea-
son to allow the sale to proceed."10 3
The Court noted that its list of factors to be considered by
the district courts was not intended to be exhaustive and should
not be used "to the exclusion of common sense and consideration
of special circumstances.1 10 4 The Court made it clear that forced
sale would be the rule, not the exception, stating: "We do empha-
size, however, that the limited discretion accorded by § 7403
should be exercised rigorously and sparingly, keeping in mind the
Government's paramount interest in prompt and certain collec-
tion of delinquent taxes."10 5
99. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 710.
100. Id. at 710-I1. Since the circuits had been divided on this issue, see supra note 18,
the expectations may vary by jurisdiction. See United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237
(1960) (federal tax enforcement should not unnecessarily disrupt local property relation-
ships). See also supra note 42.
101. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 711.
102. Id. at 704. See supra notes 27-32 and afcompanying text; see also infra notes 145-
97 and accompanying text.





C. The Rodgers Dissent
The dissenters agreed with the majority's holding that the
court of appeals decision was overly broad. They also agreed with
the majority's disposition of the Ingram case, holding that jointly
owned property could be forcibly sold where joint tax liability was
involved. 06 They disagreed, however, with the decision regarding
Mrs. Rodgers' claim.
Justice Blackmun argued that the majority had overlooked
two fundamental legal principles in its decision. First, the major-
ity's holding was directly contrary to the common law. At com-
mon law, a "lien of a judgment . . . cannot be made effectual to
bind or to convey any greater or other estate than the debtor
himself, in the exercise of his rights, could voluntarily have trans-
ferred or alienated; ' 10 7 the lienholder enjoys rights in property no
greater than the debtor; the lienholder, in effect, can only "step
into the shoes" of the debtor.10 8 This principle is applicable to tax
liens and their enforcement' 9-the tax collector may not enforce
its tax lien and thereby place itself in a better situation than the
debtor would have been in himself.
In Rodgers, the debtor could not have transferred or sold the
whole of the homestead property without the consent of his
spouse.110 Thus, the dissent concluded, allowing the federal gov-
ernment to enforce its lien against the debtors and to judicially
force the sale of the entirety of the homestead property would
contradict settled common law.""1 Secondly, although the dissent-
ers acknowledged that sections 6321 and 7403 are written in
106. Id. at 729.
107. Id. at 713.
108. Id. at 714.
109. See United States v. Erie County, 31 F. Supp. 57, 60 (W.D.N.Y. 1939).
110. See TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50. See also supra note 54.
Section 5.81 of the Texas Family Code provides that "[w]hether the homestead is the
separate property of either spouse or community property, neither spouse may sell, convey,
or encumber it without the joinder of the other spouse except as provided in sections 5.82,
5.83, 5.84, or 5.85 of this code or by other rules of law." Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.81
(Vernon 1975).
111. The dissent noted that in most situations, a joint owner does have the power to
force sale or partition. See infra note 126. Therefore it does no injury to other joint owners
to allow the government to force sale under section 7403. Examples of such joint owner-
ship situations include joint tenancy and tenancy-in-common. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 714
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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broad and sweeping language"" and may conceivably be viewed as
subject to the interpretation of the Rodgers majority, they argued
that these provisions should not be construed literally. Justice
Blackmun argued that courts faced with broadly worded statutes
in derogation of the common law, should hesitate to apply them
literally.113 He concluded that in the absence of clear congres-
sional intent to the contrary, the courts should presume that Con-
gress "did not mean by its use of general language to contravene
fundamental precepts of the common law. 1 14
The Rodgers dissent further asserted that there is no clear evi-
dence that Congress intended to abrogate the common law princi-
ple of lienholders' rights. Indeed, Justice Blackmun pointed to
contrary evidence-that Congress intended to incorporate the
common law principle into section 6321. Strong evidence of non-
abrogative intent is found in a report compiled for the House
Ways and Means Committee tracing the legislative history of the
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966.115 The report states, in part:
The homestead exemption laws of the States do not apply as against a fed-
eral tax lien. But the homestead laws of some States have been held to create
an indivisible and vested interest in the husband and wife, which cannot be
subjected to levy and sale for the separate tax of one of them.116
Congress clearly recognized the principle of lienholders'
rights stressed by the dissenters. This report noted that some state
homestead laws, including Texas', had been held to create an indi-
visible and vested interest in the husband and wife, which could
not be subjected to levy and sale for the separate tax of one of
them.11 7 Congress did not propose to change this settled law, but
suggested that in such situations a court could "declare, but not
foreclose, the lien.""' 8 Justice Blackmun also pointed out the fail-
112. Justice Blackmun stated: "I do not dispute that the general language of § 7403,
standing alone, is subject to the interpretation the Court gives it. From its enactment in
1868 to the present day, the language of this statute has been sweeping; read literally, it
admits of no exceptions." 461 U.S. at 715-16 (footnotes omitted).
113. Id. (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)).
114. Id.
115. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 89TH CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF H.R. 11256: FEDERAL TAX LIEN Acr OF 1966 (Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
116. Id. at 177. See infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
117. Id., citing Jones v. Kemp, 144 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1944); Paddock v. Siemoneit,
147 Tex. 571, 584-85, 218 S.W.2d 428, 436 (1949).
118. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 177.
1985] 315
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ure of legislative attempts to extend the reach of federal tax liens
to tenancies-by-the-entirety, asserting that these failures demon-
strated a clear intent to retain the common law. He stressed the
fact that tenancies-by-the-entirety, like the Texas homesteads,
"could not be sold to enforce the tax liability of one spouse. ' 11
Blackmun presented an extensive discussion of Mansfield v.
Excelsior Refining Co.120 The majority had noted that, read
broadly, Mansfield stands on "all fours" with the Rodgers hold-
ing.'21 Blackmun argues, however, that Mansfield undermines, not
supports, the majority's holding and that its broad reading of
Mansfield reflects only on the true breadth of the Rodgers holding.
According to the dissent, the majority's interpretation of
Mansfield,
authorizes without the consent of the owner of the fee, a judicial sale of a
building should a tenant fail to pay his taxes, a judicial sale of a farm should
the holder of an easement across it become delinquent, or a judicial sale of a
condominium or cooperative apartment house to satisfy the tax debt of any
co-owner. 2
Justice Blackmun criticized the major arguments presented by
the Court in support of its holding. He first attacked the Court's
argument that its broad reading of section 7403 was consistent
with the policies favoring prompt and certain collection of delin-
quent taxes.123 This rationale, he wrote, is overly broad and
"would support any exercise of governmental power to secure tax
payments.""24 He argued that the immediate sale of the home-
stead may in fact yield very little money, after the value of the
spouse's one-half homestead interest is deducted from the sale
price. If the government were to wait until loss or abandonment,
its discounted yield would be about the same as it would be follow-
ing the majority's procedure of immediate sale. The principle dif-
ference is that under the common law rule "Mrs. Rodgers' entitle-
119. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 719, (citing United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326, 331
(8th Cir. 1951) and United States v. Nathanson, 60 F. Supp. 193, 194 (E.D. Mich. 1945)).
120. 135 U.S. 326 (1890) (tenant who operated a distillery on leased property was
delinquent in payment of taxes. The government sought to force sale by administrative
levy of the entire fee, not just the delinquent's interest. The Court held that the govern-
ment, by summary process, may only force sale of the delinquent interest).
121. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 691 n.17.
122. Id. at 723 (footnotes omitted).
123. Id. at 694, 724-25.
124. Id. at 724.
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ment to live out her life on her homestead would be
respected."1
25
The dissent also criticized the majority's contention that a
contrast of sections 6331 and 7403 supports the judicially en-
forced sale by the entirety. Although section 7403 does entitle the
government to force partition 2 6 in certain situations where the
delinquent taxpayer has the right to do so, this fact, in the dis-
sent's opinion, does not justify the Court's expansive conclu-
sion."' The broad language of section 7403 empowers the federal
government to enforce its lien and to exercise only those rights
possessed by the delinquent taxpayer. 2
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority's contention that its
reading of section 7403 is consistent with the traditional powers
of a taxing authority in an in rem proceeding. According to Justice
Blackmun, this is simply not so. 29 The Court ignores the fact that
the rules pertaining to in rem sales do not apply when third parties
have indefeasible rights and interests in the property. According
to the dissent, "the traditional distinction between taxes for which
the land is liable and tax liabilities personal to the taxpayer would




The dissent compared the facts in the Rodgers case with those
in Ingram, to explain why it would force sale in one instance, but
not the other. Because Mrs. Rodgers was unindebted to the fed-
eral government and had an indestructible property right in the
homestead, the dissent reasoned that section 7403 was not in-
tended to allow forced sale of her property. The facts are materi-
ally different in Ingram. Mrs. Ingram and her husband were
jointly liable for unpaid federal taxes and since they were di-
vorced the property was subject to partition under state law.' 31
125. Id. at 725.
126. Partition is defined as the "dividing of lands held by joint tenants, coparceners,
or tenants-in-common, into distinct portions, so that they may hold them in severalty."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, 1008 (5th ed. 1979). For a discussion of the background of parti-
tion law, and the several forms, see R. PoWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 11
609-614 (1968).
127. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 726. For a discussion of the majority's reasoning, see supra
text accompanying note 86.
128. See supra text accompanying note 39.
129. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 726.
130. Id. at 728.
131. Id. at 729-30. See W. PLUMB, supra note 10, at 35 (discussing partition).
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' III. IMPACT OF Rodgers
The Rodgers Court had a difficult task: reconciling the roles of
state and federal law which had overlapped in the area of federal
tax liens on jointly owned property. The Rodgers decision did
"solve" this problem. Its solution, however, is a rather simplistic
one: state homestead exemption laws cannot operate, either as a
property right or exemption, 13 2 to preclude enforcement of a fed-
eral tax lien. The tax lien is an exercise of the federal goverment's
"sovereign prerogative" 13 3 and has priority over state-defined
homestead exemption rights. The only limit on lien enforcement
is the equitable discretion of the federal courts.
The Court's decision reaffirmed two important objectives of
the federal tax collection scheme: uniformity and the prompt and
certain collection of taxes.'" The circuits will no longer be di-
vided, and consequently jurisdiction will no longer be the basis for
disparities in protection of property rights. Clearly this is a posi-
tive move. Yet serious questions are raised regarding the costs and
practical effects of the Rodgers decision.
The basic question before the Court was one of statutory in-
terpretation. Did Congress, in its enactment of section 7403, in-
tend to allow the sale of the entirety of the property in which the
delinquent taxpayer holds only a partial interest? The Court an-
swered this question in the affirmative, rejecting the interest limi-
tation of Folsom. The Court so held despite the fact that such an
interpretation violates the common law principle of debtor-credi-
tor relations, and the fact that its enforcement would have an im-
pact on interests other than the state-defined property interests of
the delinquent taxpayer. Such a far-reaching measure might not
have been necessary.
Despite the fact that the delinquent taxpayer did not possess a
property right to sell the homestead, the IRS, in its sovereign pre-
rogative, may now enforce its creditor's right to force sale. The
case law requiring federal deference to state-defined property laws
has been reduced to rhetoric.13 5
The post-Rodgers status of the law in this area is difficult to
132. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
133. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 697. See infra text accompanying notes 161-71.
134. See supra note 17.
135. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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discern. 13 6 Serious questions are raised by the Rodgers decision:
the degree of state involvement, the remainder of the homestead
exemption laws, the completeness of the compensation to third
parties, and the standing of the IRS as a sovereign creditor.
A. Remaining State Law Involvement
In 1960 the United States Supreme Court ruled that federal
courts, including the Supreme Court, must look to state law to
determine the property rights against which the IRS can attach
tax consequences. 1 7 Presumably, the IRS enforcement power is
limited by the property rights granted by state law.
The Rodgers decision implicitly questions this limitation. De-
spite the fact that the delinquent taxpayer could not sell the
homestead without the consent of the other interest holder, the
creditor rights of the IRS were allowed to extend beyond the
property interest of the delinquent taxpayer to allow forced sale
of the entire property.
What remains of state involvement in the tax enforcement
system? Rodgers leaves the impression that the role of the state is
simply to identify the property interests of the taxpayer. The IRS
enforcement mechanism then steps in to force sale, stretching or
ignoring state-defined property interest limitations.
B. Homestead Exemption Laws
Although important objectives of federal tax collection were
realized in Rodgers, important objectives of state homestead ex-
emptions were lost. Homestead exemptions were designed to pre-
clude seizure and forced sale of the homestead property. 138 These
136. Several practitioner-oriented commentaries address the issues presented in the
Rodgers decision. See Lore & Goldstein, Two New Supreme Court Decisions Define the Priority of
the Government's Liens, 59 J. TAX'N 120 (1983); McKenney, U.S. Supreme Court Rewrites Joint
Property Law, Creates Title Problems, 62 MICH. B.J. 636 (1983); Young, LR.S. May Sell Home
Despite Homestead Right, 69 A.B.A. J. 1128 (1983).
Although Lore and Goldstein, supra maintain that the Rodgers decision merely concerns
priority, McKenney, supra, has gone so far as to say that it rewrites joint property law and
creates substantial title-clouding problems. The first seems overly restrictive and the sec-
ond plausible. While the Rodgers decision did involve questions of priority, its effect will
carry beyond priority issues alone.
137. United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 241-42 (1960). See supra note 41.
138. 40 C.J.S. Homesteads § 2 (1944) ("[tlhese laws are based on the theory that the
preservation of the homestead is of greater importance than the payment of debts ... ").
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exemptions carry with them policy considerations, including pro-
motion of state stability and welfare through preservation of
homes where families may be sheltered "beyond the reach of eco-
nomic misfortune, "'139 and protection of society from the danger
of its citizens becoming paupers . *...140 Homestead exemptions
are founded not upon principles of equity, but rather upon princi-
ples protecting the interests of humanity.'4
The Rodgers decision thwarted, if not destroyed, these crucial
objectives of the homestead exemption in this context. The policy
favoring prompt collection of delinquent taxes is furthered at a
high cost. The framers of the Texas Constitution sought to pro-
tect surviving spouses from economic misfortune by providing for
a homestead interest roughly equivalent to that of a life estate.4
This homestead was to be beyond the reach of most creditors.143 Al-
though the homestead exemption may not have protected delin-
quent interest-holders from their own tax liability and foreclosure
of their interests,'4 in many jurisdictions it clearly would have
prevented forced sale of the entire homestead. The Supreme
Court, in its effort to ensure the prompt and certain collection of
taxes, has encroached upon the states' right to define the property
rights of its citizens. The security of the protected homestead
granted by the Texas Constitution has been effectively destroyed.
C. Complete Compensation?
The Rodgers Court concluded that the unindebted holder of a
homestead interest which had been forcibly sold would be com-
pletely compensated out of the sale proceeds. 45 Using actuarial
tables developed to determine the value of a life estate interest,
the Court determined that a surviving spouse would be entitled to
139. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homesteads § 4 (1968).
140. 40 C.J.S. Homesteads § 2 (1944).
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. 1978) ("[t]his home-
stead right of the survivor has been held to be one in the nature of a legal life estate or life
estate created by operation of law.").
143. See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 697.
144. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
145. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 680. Early Texas case law describes the homestead exemp-
tion as "absolute." See, e.g., In re Mussey, 179 F. 1001 (W.D. Tex. 1910). The Rodgers
Court even commented that the "Texas homestead laws are almost absolute in their pro-
tections against forced sale." Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 711 (footnote omitted).
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as much as ninety-five percent of the sale proceeds. Because inno-
cent third parties are duly compensated for the "taking" by the
government, no due process problems will arise. 46 The Court
stated that
the Supremacy Clause-which provides the underpinning for the Federal
Government's right to sweep aside state-created exemptions in the first place-is
as potent in its application to innocent bystanders as in its application to
delinquent debtors .... Whatever property rights attach to a homestead
under Texas law are adequately discharged by the payment of compensa-
tion, and no further deference to state law is required, either by § 7403 or
by the Constitution.1
4 7
The Court realized that "innocent bystanders" were involved.
The decision, however, legitimizes the forced sale of an
unindebted individual's home through enforcement of creditors'
rights against the indebted individual. The Court, acknowledging
the fact that post-sale monetary compensation would be insuffi-
cient in certain situations, left it to the district courts to prevent
injustice, instructing them to apply this discretion nar-
rowly-making sale the rule and not the exception. 148
The Court's notion that the unindebted spouse will be "com-
pletely compensated" out of the proceeds of the sale is illusory.
The fact is, anything less than 100% of the homestead's fair mar-
ket value (or replacement value) will not be adequate economic
compensation. Furthermore, the sentimental value of the home-
stead may never be replaced. Prior to the forced sale, the
unindebted spouse had an interest in a home, equivalent to a life-
estate under state law. The interest holder was effectively assured
a home for life and could not lose this interest unless he or she
conveyed the property, abandoned the homestead, or failed to pay
the property taxes. After the forced sale, however, the individual
is left with only monetary compensation. Although this compensa-
tion may be a significant amount, it will not replace the security
and stablity of a life interest in a family home. This compensation
is in fact incomplete.4 9
146. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 680, 697-700.
147. Id. at 701 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 711 ("the limited discretion accorded by § 7403 should be exercised vigor-
ously and sparingly, keeping in mind the Government's paramount interest in prompt and
certain collection of delinquent taxes").
149. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
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D. Implications of Rodgers on Debtor-Creditor Relations
The dissent correctly stressed the common law principle that
a lienholder cannot enforce its rights against an individual so as to
place himself in a better position than the debtor occupied prior
to enforcement. The Rodgers majority viewed its holding as consis-
tent with this principle,150 distinguishing between the right to col-
lect, and the right to force sale. Although Mrs. Rodgers' home-
stead could be sold, the government could not collect the proceeds
from sale of her interest in the property. The relevance of this
distinction is far from obvious. The logic of the interest limitation
has been stretched to the point of ridiculousness.15 Since the de-
linquent taxpayers could not have sold the homestead without the
consent of their spouses, the IRS-as a creditor stepping into the
shoes of the debtor-should not be permitted to sell without con-
sent either.
E. Effect of Rodgers on Tenancies-by-the-Entirety
One of the most problematic aspects of Rodgers is the legi-
timization of the IRS's power to enforce its creditor's rights be-
yond those held by the indebted taxpayer. The scope of this legi-
timization may well affect other interests similar to the homestead
interest, such as the tenancy-by-the-entirety. Like the homestead
interest holder, a tenant-by-the-entirety cannot convey the prop-
erty without the consent of other interest holders. 2 If the IRS
can force the unconsented sale despite the inability of the delin-
quent to do so in the homestead context, there is little reason to
believe that it could not do so in the tenancy-by-the-entirety con-
text as well.
The Rodgers decision may create significant "title problems"
for a husband and wife who own property as tenants-by-the-en-
tirety, since title companies may no longer be willing to provide
title or mortgage insurance fearing the possibility of forced sale of
the property.153 This conclusion is based upon the pre-Rodgers
150. The Court stated "[w]e agree with the Court of Appeals that the Government's
lien under § 6321 cannot extend beyond the property interests held by the delinquent
taxpayer." Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 690-91 (footnote omitted).
151. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
152. See K. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 126, at 11 618, 620, and 623.
153. Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337, 1343 (6th Cir. 1971); see also McKenney, supra
note 136, at 639.
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Michigan rule that tenants-by-the-entirety could deliver clear title
to a purchaser despite the fact that one spouse was indebted to the
federal government for taxes. This rule was set forth in Cole v.
Cardoza,15 4 where the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that tenants-by-the-entirety hold under a single title. Neither
spouse alone has the power to alienate the estate or any other in-
terest therein. This characteristic makes the tenancy-by-the-en-
tirety similar to the homestead/life-estate interest. The court fur-
ther held that "neither the land nor the rents and profits
therefrom are subject to levy or execution for the sole debts of the
husband."155
If the Rodgers case applies to tenancies-by-the-entirety, its im-
pact may extend significantly beyond the state of Texas and the
eight other community property states.156 A strong argument can
be made that Rodgers does apply to tenancy-by-the-entirety situa-
tions. As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent, homestead
and tenancy-by-the-entirety interests are similar in a fundamental
way. In both cases, a fractional-interest holder cannot force parti-
tion of the entirety of the premises. 57 Application of the Rodgers
rule to tenancies-by-the-entirety will, in effect, rewrite a substan-
tial portion of state property law pertaining to these interests. 58
Over twenty years ago, in United States v. Brosnan,151 the
Court adopted state law definitions within the federal tax collec-
tion scheme because it believed that "the need for uniformity...
is outweighed by the severe dislocation to local property relation-
ships which would result from our disregarding state proce-
dures."1 '' The Rodgers decision may result in just such a disloca-
tion of well settled state-defined property relationships.
154. 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1971).
155. Id. at 1343 (emphasis added).
156. The eight community property states include Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisi-
ana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington. See R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note
126, $1 625-630.
157. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 715.
158. Id. at 715-16.
159. 363 U.S. 237, 241-42 (1960).
160. Id. at 242. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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F. Implications of Rodgers on the Status of the IRS as a "Sovereign"
Creditor
One of the most important aspects of the Rodgers decision is
its further elevation of the IRS's status above that of other credi-
tors. The Rodgers majority stated: "[T]he use of the power
granted by § 7403 is not the act of an ordinary creditor, but the
exercise of a sovereign prerogative, incident to the power to enforce
the obligations of the delinquent taxpayer himself, and ultimately
grounded in the constitutional mandate to 'lay and collect
taxes.' "161 This statement has the potential to strengthen the
IRS's position in comparison to other creditors competing for the
same property. The actual impact of this general statement of IRS
"sovereignty" can only be determined by future observation of its
interpretation.
In United States v. Whiting Pools,"6 2 decided only nine days af-
ter the Rodgers decision, the Supreme Court had an opportunity
to rule on the IRS's standing in relation to other creditors in a
bankruptcy proceeding. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Rodgers,
wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court in Whiting Pools.
Whiting Pools, Inc., failed to pay $92,000 in Federal Insur-
ance Contribution Act Taxes.163 The IRS seized property of
Whiting Pools pursuant to section 6331 of the Code,'" intending
to proceed with a tax sale.1 65 The day after the seizure, Whiting
Pools filed a chapter eleven bankruptcy petition in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York.
The IRS moved "for a declaration that the automatic stay provi-
sion of the Bankruptcy Code, § 362(a), was inapplicable to the IRS
or, in the alternative, for relief from the stay." ' Applying sec-
tion 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act,167 the bankruptcy
court ordered the IRS to turn over the seized property to the
trustee. The IRS appealed. The district court reversed, holding
that the turnover order was not authorized. The court of appeals,
161. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 697 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
162. 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (unanimous Court).
163. Id. at 199-200.
164. 26 U.S.C. § 6331 (1982).
165. Whiting, 462 U.S. at 200-01. Section 6335 provides for sale of seized property
after notice is given. 26 U.S.C. § 6335 (1982).
166. Whiting, 462 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added). See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
167. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1982).
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reversing the district court, held that the turnover order was, in
fact, authorized under section 542(a).168 The Supreme Court af-
firmed, stating: "We see no reason why a different result should
obtain when the IRS is the creditor. The Service is bound by §
542(a) to the same extent as any other secured creditor."" 9 By
refusing to grant the IRS special rights beyond that of any other
secured creditor, the Court restricted the troublesome Rodgers
language which describes the IRS as a creditor with "sovereign
prerogative."
In In re Levenhar,17 0 the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of New York relied upon the Rodgers dictum
to stress the fact that a spouse who jointly owns property may be
entitled to as much as ninety-five percent of the sale proceeds.
The court held that the trustee had not established that sale of
the estate's undivided interest would realize significantly less than
sale of the estate free of the wife's interest. Rodgers was relied
upon to support the premise that the nonfiling spouse's interest in
the property should not be assumed to be only fifty percent, but
might be as high as ninety-five percent.
In United States v. Pilla, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit ruled on a case very similar to Rodgers. Mr. Pilla was in-
debted for failure to pay federal withholding taxes on his business.
The IRS initiated an action under section 7403 attempting to
force the sale of the Pilla home. Mrs. Pilla, who was not indebted
to the IRS, raised the Minnesota homestead exemption as a de-
fense to the forced sale. The court remanded the case to deter-
mine several questions: the precise nature of the homestead ex-
emption right; whether equitable discretion should be applied;
and the portion of the sale proceeds to which Mrs. Pilla would be
entitled if equitable discretion were not applied.
The Pilla court expressly relied upon the Rodgers rule that
state homestead exemptions cannot operate to preclude sale. The
remand was solely for the purposes of determining adequate com-
pensation to avoid due process difficulties. The court also relied
168. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 674 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1982), revg, In re
Whiting Pools, Inc., 15 Bankr. 270 (W.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (unani-
mous Court).
169. Whiting, 462 U.S. at 209.
170. 30 Bankr. 976 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
171. 711 F.2d 94 (8th Cir. 1983)
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upon the strong language of Rodgers regarding the status of the
IRS as a creditor stating: "The [Rodgers] Court pointed out that
the IRS has rights superior to those of an 'ordinary creditor,'
since it is not acting as an ordinary creditor, but rather is exercis-
ing 'a sovereign prerogative' . . . ultimately grounded in the con-
stitutional mandate to 'lay and collect taxes.' "172
It is unclear what the status of the IRS as a "sovereign" credi-
tor will be following Rodgers. Despite the language in Whiting Pools
indicating the IRS's standing as an ordinary secured creditor in the
bankruptcy setting, the Pilla court expressly relied upon the
strong sovereignty language of Rodgers. Consequently, it is diffi-
cult to predict the exact impact of the Rodgers decision on the
IRS's standing as a creditor. Nevertheless, it is clear that its stand-
ing is significantly bolstered by the Rodgers decision.
CONCLUSION
The Rodgers decision clearly establishes the priority of the
federal tax lien over state-defined homestead exemptions. In its
efforts to realize the goal of prompt and certain collection of
taxes, the Court overlooked fundamental principles of debtor-
creditor relations, established state powers, and goals of the home-
stead exemptions. The federal government is now permitted to
enforce its lien against a delinquent taxpayer and place itself in a
better position than the taxpayer enjoyed prior to enforcement.
This is clearly contrary to the common law of debtor-creditor re-
lations. Texas had clearly established that one spouse could not
force sale of the homestead property without the consent of the
other. Since Rodgers, the government may enforce its lien against
one spouse and, through the exercise of "sovereign prerogative,"
force sale of the entirety of the homestead property.
The broad holding of the Court could easily carry over to
tenancies-by-the-entirety. Well-settled state law is redefined by the
Court's holding. A complex set of property rights and relations is
disturbed by the Court's effort to promptly collect delinquent
taxes, despite the fact that it is unclear whether the government's
interest would in fact be injured by delayed enforcement.
The Court's decision overrides the efforts of the framers of
the Texas homestead exemption to protect the family homesteads
172. Id. at 96 (quoting Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 697).
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of its citizens from the reach of creditors. Amidst the shuffle, the
unindebted spouse loses the security of a "life estate" in the fam-
ily homestead and is left with incomplete monetary compensation.
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